The notoriously hard problem of consciousness asks whether the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experience might be mundane. Reductive intentionalism, inspired by the promise of naturalized cognitive science, answers positively. Under the assumption that the intentional content of cognitive states will itself be naturalized in the anticipated golden age of scientific psychology, reductive intentionalism would construe experiential character to be determined by, or identical with, intentional content. Antagonists, including those who share intentionalists’ hope for a naturalistic account of phenomenal character reliant on only the resources of cognitive science, object. They maintain that the content of a phenomenally characterized experience is duplicable by a nonexperiential cognitive state that lacks the phenomenal character of the experience. Intentionalists counter that the richness and fine-grained determinacy of the content of perceptual experience renders it nonconceptual and, thus, beyond rehearsal by rival nonexperiential states. Siding with the antagonists, I argue that careful consideration of the important seminal work of Sperling on the nature of memory in perceptual contexts undermines the defense in which reductive intentionalists trust. Contra intentionalism, non-experiential cognitive states drained of phenomenal character can indeed replicate the rich content of experience. Accordingly, phenomenal character is neither determined by, nor identical with, content.

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