Many readings of Kierkegaard share a tacit premise: namely, that passions or emotions are simply irrational. And if this were the case, then the great Danish existential philosopher would indeed be a crazy irrationalist. But what if we look at a text such as *Fear and Trembling* on its own terms? Does “Johannes de Silentio,” Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, share the assumption that passion, or emotion, is opposed to reason? In fact, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous text plainly indicates that passionate cognition may be a source of legitimate insight; furthermore, it attributes to passion the function of forming beliefs which are potentially true. This alternative way of understanding the passions is central to the logic of *Fear and Trembling*. Reinterpreting this notorious work, I try to capture the sense in which passions for Kierkegaard ought to carry more weight than mere dispassionate reason. That leads to questions about the limits of what a human being – such as the biblical Abraham – can know. Yet if the prophet appears to be irrational, and his actions morally questionable, this cannot be exclusively because he is guided by passionate inspiration and not by apathetic rationality.